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1. UNIVERSAL PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
I will discuss two main topics in this lecture.
Firstly, the Universal Distribution and some of its
properties: its accuracy, its incomputability, its subjectivity.
Secondly, I’m going to tell how to use this distribution to
create very intelligent machines.
Many years ago—in 1960—I discovered what we now
call the Universal Probability Distribution [1]. It is the
probability distribution on all possible output strings of a
universal computer with random input. It seemed to solve all
kinds of prediction problems and resolve serious difficulties
in the foundations of Bayesian statistics.
Suppose we have a string, x, and we want to know its
universal probability with respect to machine M . There will
be many inputs to machine M that will give x as output.
Say si is the ith such input. If si is of length L(si) bits, the
probability that a random binary input would be si is just
2−L(si). To get the probability that x will be produced by
any of its programs, we sum the probabilities of all of them
to get PM(x), the probability assigned to x by the universal
distribution, using machine M as reference:
PM(x) =
∑
i
2−L(si). (1)
It is easy to use this distribution for prediction: if x is
a binary string, then the probability that 1 will be the next
symbol of x is just
PM(x1)/(PM(x0) + PM(x1)).
Five years later, in 1965, Kolmogorov, not yet having
read my paper, independently discovered ‘Kolmogorov
Complexity’. The Kolmogorov Complexity of a string of
symbols, x, is the length of the shortest program for a
reference universal computer that produces x as output. It is
closely related to the Universal Distribution. If K is the
Kolmogorov Complexity of x then 2−K is an approximation
to the probability of x obtained by the universal distribution.
This is easy to see, since the shortest program for x will give
the most weight of all of the terms in Equation (1).
∗A new University of London annual series. This lecture was given on
27 February 2003.
FIGURE 1. The author, Professor R. Solomonoff (left), receiving
the Kolmogorov medal on the occasion of the inaugral University
of London Kolmogorov Lecture, organized by the Computer
Learning Research Centre, at Royal Holloway on February 27th
2003. This annual lecture commemorates the life and work
of Andrei Nikolaevich Kolmogorov (1903–1987), a scholar and
pioneer in the fields of information and probability theory.
Initially Kolmogorov was interested in the mathematical
properties of this complexity—in particular, he used it to
define randomness. He defined x to be random if its
Kolmogorov Complexity is about the same as the length
of x in bits. He was surprised to learn of my earlier work
on inductive inference and publicized my discoveries in the
Soviet Union, so for many years they were much better
known there than in the United States.
I was puzzled that Kolmogorov hadn’t thought of using
these concepts for inductive inference—to define empirical
probability—since one of his first great works was the
axiomization of probability theory and he had written
voluminously on practical applications of probability.
I asked Leonid Levin, who was one of his students at that
time, how Kolmogorov could have missed this important
discovery. Leonid suggested that inductive inference was, at
that time, not actually a ‘mathematical’ problem. I wasn’t
much satisfied with this idea but, thinking about it later,
it may have been that in 1965 there was no really good
definition of induction and certainly no general criterion for
how good an inductive system was.
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2. INDUCTIVE INFERENCE AND THE
CONVERGENCE THEOREM
After my initial discovery I tried to find a criterion for
the accuracy of my prediction method and finally thought
of a good one: suppose we have a probabilistic algorithm
that can be described in a finite number of bits and this
algorithm produces a long sequence of symbols according
to its probabilistic rules. Then suppose we have a general
induction system that gives probabilities for each symbol, in
terms of the previous symbols. For a good general induction
system, and a long enough sequence, the probabilities given
to the symbols by the two different methods should be very
close.
While this criterion seemed reasonable, I was at first
unable to prove that the Universal Distribution satisfied it.
In 1968 I was asked to review a paper on Inductive
Inference, by David Willis. Though I was familiar with
the ideas in the paper, it took me about 6 months to really
understand it.
Willis had taken my system for induction and made it
into an exact, rigorously defined system. He had an error
criterion it satisfied, but it was certainly not enough to
convince anyone that the system was good for prediction.
He showed that the average ratio of the correct probability
to the estimated probability approached one as the length
of data sequence increased—the individual probability ratios
could, however, be quite large or quite small. The individual
true and estimated probabilities could be quite different.
However, I was able to improve this result to show that the
expected values of the sum of the squares of the differences
in probabilities between the correct and the estimated values
was bounded by a constant. The errors in the individual
bit probability values had to approach zero faster than 1/n,
n being the length of the sequence. This was a very powerful
result.
I called it the Convergence Theorem.
This theorem made it clear that the universal distribution
gave very good probability estimates.
I sent in a strong recommendation that Willis’ paper be
published with no revisions—but the other two reviewers
had already rejected it—they felt that it added little to my
original paper!
I wrote to Willis telling him what a great paper it was and
suggested that he send it to another journal. He did this and
it was published two years later.
The first Convergence Theorem was for the Normalized
Universal Distribution on potentially infinite sequences of
symbols [2]. Peter Ga´cs [3] showed that it was also true
for an Unnormalized Semimeasure. Then Marcus Hutter [4]
showed it worked for an arbitrary (not-binary) alphabet and
for a variety of Loss Functions—one of them very general.
More recently, I showed that it’s true for Grammatical
Induction—in which the data is a set of finite strings.
It also works for Operator Induction in which these finite
strings are probabilistic answers to questions that have been
generated by an unknown stochastic question answering
algorithm [5].
While the accuracy of the universal distribution as a
predictor was certainly critical, other important features
were discovered.
• The data need not be stationary: subsequences of data
can be missing; the data can be multidimensional—
extending finitely or infinitely in all positive and/or
negative directions.
• It is often possible to obtain predictions using a truly
a priori probability distribution (obtained before the
data was known). Under these conditions there is no
underfitting or overfitting—the data need not be divided
into training set and test set—all data can be used
from training and the expected value of the squared
probability error will be unbiased.
• It is possible to use partial recursive functions to model
the data. To my knowledge no one has actually tried
this, but the system I will describe later will do it.
Whether it gets better results than using only recursive
models remains to be seen!
3. INCOMPUTABILITY OF UNIVERSAL
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
While these features are all very beautiful, there seemed at
first to be a quite serious problem—that universal probability
was incomputable. Surprisingly enough, this turned out to
be not a Bug but a Feature!
But before I explain—a brief discussion of uncertainty in
prediction. There are two kinds of uncertainty in statistical
results: the best known is uncertainty in probability values
due to finite sample size. Suppose we have a binary string
of n bits and half of them are zero, half of them are one.
Then the probability of a 1 being the next bit is about
1/2 ± 1/2√n. The larger the sample size, n, is, the less
error in our probability estimate.
The kind of uncertainty I’m going to talk about is not
due to sample size, however, but to ‘Model Uncertainty’.
When analysing empirical data, there is normally an infinite
number of models that can be used to analyse the data—
some will give good predictions, others will give poor
predictions—but to achieve a specified degree of accuracy,
we need to investigate only a finite number of these models.
The incomputability occurs because certain models are
partial recursive, so that in any finite time one can’t be sure
one has evaluated them correctly. It is certain that if enough
time were spent the error would be less than , but for any
particular  one cannot know how large that time must be.
Let’s look at this another way. The exact value of
π or
√
2, is incomputable, but we know how to make
approximations, and we know that the approximations will
eventually converge to correct values.
For the universal distribution, we can also make
approximations that we know will eventually converge to the
right values.
However, these approximations differ from the approx-
imations of π because at no point in the sequence of
approximations can we know a useful upper bound on
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error in probability—we never know how large the error
is. Furthermore, it is not a small effect. No matter how
many models we’ve tried, and how long we’ve tried, there
is always the very real possibility that we have not yet
considered a particularly good model—but we would find
it in just a few more minutes of search.
It turns out that any ‘complete’ prediction system (one sat-
isfying the Convergence Theorem) must be incomputable.
For any computable prediction method there must be reg-
ularities that are invisible to it—and if the data has those
regularities, we have errors of unknown size.
To summarize: all computable prediction methods—
not just approximations to the universal distribution—have
errors of unknown size. There is no way to avoid this. It is a
property of probability itself.
As an example, suppose we have a data set and we choose
a set of models to do prediction on it. We might pick the best
model in the set using MDL (minimum description length)
or some other criterion. No matter how well the model seems
to fit, it is possible that there is a better model outside the set
of models considered and there is no way to estimate the
probability of this being true. Using the best model we’ve
found thus far, necessarily gives an error of unknown size.
Certain scientists have expressed much confidence in their
estimates of probability of catastrophic failure in nuclear
reactors, national defense systems and in public safety
regulations for genetic engineering. The considerations I
have mentioned lead one to question this confidence.
There is a tendency to try to deal with this issue by avoid-
ing the use of the incomputable Universal Distribution—but
this does not face the problem. The problem is that empirical
probability itself is incomputable—and computable approxi-
mations to it, as well as any computable probability estimate
will always have errors of uncertain size.
The study of Universal Distributions has made this
uncertainty clear. We should not punish the reporter that
brings the bad news!
4. PRIOR INFORMATION
Another apparent difficulty with the Universal Distribution
is its subjectivity. When the Universal Distribution is
mentioned, there are two possible meanings of the term
‘Universal’. First, that the error will converge to zero
rapidly if the algorithm generating the data has a small finite
description. This is true for all such generating algorithms.
This is what I mean by Universal Distribution.
Another interpretation of Universality is that we can
usefully employ the same Universal Distribution for all
problems. This is what is called a half truth. The same
Universal Distribution will indeed work for all problems,
but, for most, it will work poorly—the errors will converge
very slowly. This is because the algorithm generating the
data has the equivalent of a very long description, for the
universal description being used. To get good predictions it
is usually necessary to use a different Universal Distribution
for each Problem Domain. Choice of the distribution will
depend on a priori information—the information known
before the statistician sees the data.
As soon as data is used to solve a problem, the
statisticians’ a priori is updated to reflect that solution—
so we have a continually changing a priori probability
distribution throughout the life of the statistician that reflects
the problems solved during his or her life.
A philosopher may ask: is there not a universal
a priori probability distribution in which you have no prior
information?
To answer this question, let me give an analogy:
If I had no food, water or air to breathe, what would I
do?—very little to be done—I would die quickly.
Similarly, if I had no a priori information, there would
be little that I could do to solve a statistical problem (or any
other problem for that matter!).
Fortunately, we don’t ever get into this situation: we
are born with fairly good a priori knowledge of the world
we are to live in. This a priori information enables us
to learn to walk, to learn to communicate and to learn
to adapt to hostile environments. It is very unlikely that
we would ever learn these things, if we didn’t have this
a priori information. The exact nature of the a priori
information that a person has is difficult to characterize.
However, we normally have to use only part of it. For
a specific problem, we often have strong ideas as to what
functions would be useful to solve it—in which case, we
would augment the instruction set of our universal computer
with those functions. If we are less certain of what functions
are needed, we might use a set of instructions that has been
designed for a more general prediction method—such sets
of instructions are in C++ libraries, or parts of Mathematica,
Maple or Matlab. If the instructions inserted are not relevant
to the correct probability function, the convergence rate
will be slow, but it will converge eventually to the correct
values.
This subjectivity—the fact that they are based on choice
of which Universal machine to use—is characteristic
of all prediction systems based on a priori probability
distributions. The choice of Universal machine and its
instruction set is a necessary parameter in the system that
enables us to insert a priori information into it.
The dependence of the universal distribution on choice of
machine is not a Bug in the system—it, too, is a Necessary
Feature.
5. INTELLIGENT MACHINES
My main goal in studying universal distributions was not
especially prediction, but strong artificial intelligence (AI)—
for me, this meant writing a program that could work most
scientific problems much better than humans can.
Many years ago—about the time of the discovery of
the Universal Distribution—Newell and Simon programmed
GPS—General Problem Solver [6]—a program that was
meant to solve a great variety of problems.
In fact, it only solved a small subset of what we call
‘Inversion problems’ in a very deterministic way. Perhaps its
most important defects were that it had no concept of
probability and it was absolutely unable to learn.
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Suppose you gave it a problem and after a long time, with
great difficulty, it finally solved it. If you gave it the same
problem the next day, it would solve the problem in the same
difficult way, taking the same length of time.
Nevertheless, the AI community was pretty much taken
with GPS and the expert systems that followed, and for many
years there was relatively little work in AI involving learning
or probability.
About 1984, roughly 25 years later, at an annual meeting
of the American Association for Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI), a vote was taken and it was decided that probability
was in no way relevant to AI.
A protest group quickly formed and the next year there
was a workshop at the AAAI meeting devoted to Probability
and Uncertainty in AI. This workshop has continued to the
present day to be a yearly event.
As part of the protest at the first workshop, I gave a
paper on applying the universal distribution to problems in
AI [7]. This was an early version of the system that I’ve been
developing since that time [5, 8].
My interest has always been in a much more general
class of problem solver than that originally envisioned by
Newell and Simon. The system I’ve been working on solves
problems with both probabilistic and deterministic answers
and learning is an integral part of the system.
It is designed to learn to solve two kinds of problems.
Almost all problems in science and engineering are of these
two kinds.
The first kind is function inversion. These are the
P and NP problems of computational complexity theory.
They include theorem proving, solution of equations,
symbolic integration, etc.
The second kind of problem is time limited optimization.
Inductive inference, surface reconstruction and image
restoration are a few examples of this kind of problem.
Designing an automobile in 6 months satisfying certain
specifications and having minimal cost is another.
The general understanding of probability that we have
obtained through the universal distribution has enabled us to
design programs that can learn to solve both of these kinds
of problems in a manner that seems to follow the acquisition
of new skills by humans.
In the infant machine, we have a set of problem-solving
techniques inserted by the trainer. We have a conditional
probability distribution based on the previous experience
of the trainer and the machine, which suggests which
problem-solving techniques should be used with which
problems.
The experienced system has many more problem-solving
techniques. When the system is given a new problem
it uses its previous experience with similar problems to
decide which problem-solving techniques to try and how
much time to spend on each trial. This experience is
embodied in a General Conditional Probability Distribution.
This distribution gives the probability that each problem-
solving technique will be the best technique for solving
any particular problem. The condition on the probability
distribution is the problem to be solved and the distribution
itself will be on the probability that each problem-solving
technique will be the best way to solve that particular
problem.
The system uses this probability distribution to decide
how much time to spend on each problem-solving technique.
After the problem is solved the General Conditional
Probability Distribution is modified, and the problem-
solving techniques may be modified, augmented or deleted
in view of this recent experience.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The last talk I gave at Royal Holloway was at a symposium
on the ‘Importance of Being Learnable’. I discussed
some approaches to ‘transfer learning’—how learning in
one domain could utilize information from other apparently
disparate domains.
Much of my work of recent years has been in developing
and understanding the updating system that enables the
General Conditional Probability Distribution to implement
direct learning and transfer learning from both successful
and unsuccessful problem-solving trials [5].
Recently, Juergen Schmidhuber has programmed OOPS
[9], a system for incremental learning, inspired in part by
my work in this area.
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